Competitive Bidding for Mineral Resource Allocation - My article in the magazine 'Mining India'
Process of allocation of mineral resources must be a determinant of objectives of National Mineral Policy and the market dynamics. While the National Mineral Policy 2008 clearly identifies the objectives of enhancing investments in the sector, creating environment for innovation and new technology adoption, promotion of sustainable and scientific mining and of transparent process of mineral allocation, the objectives do not spell revenue maximization for state, which, of late, has become one of the concerns as a fall out of events in other sectors, telecom in particular.
While industry may aver with the intent to bring in transparency and systematic approach to allocation of mineral resource assets or blocks and may welcome the concept of competitive bidding for the same, there are concerns regarding the details of the procedure.
From the conceptual foundation, the process of mineral resource allocation must consider the questions of to whom, how much and when must the resources be allocated. In the context of power generation and Steel, the composition of raw materials in their total cost of production is high enough for these companies to seek backward integration. In such cases, they are likely to be viewed as eligible candidates for allocation. The clamor in the industry that competitive bidding process to allow only the captive mining requirements and to keep the independent mining companies out of the reckoning may be decided based on this criterion, as also on the depth of market. Independent mining companies may be allowed to operate alongside in order to widen the market participation. This, however, must also be subject to a preference to the consumers of the minerals or those who propose value addition. It makes business sense to add value to minerals through beneficiations or manufacturing rather than allowing such resources to be targeted at international markets in the raw form that fetches lower values for national resources. The bottom line is that the procedure must also allow for participation only the serious players. These can include reputed mining companies and consumer industry participants, who are direct stakeholders in the mining sector. Unrestricted participation is likely to result in cornering of precious resources and their opportunistic trading as when the market provides, and thus depriving the consumer industries the valuable input raw materials.
The question of how much is easy to address as the raw material security concerns will require the investors or project developers to look for size of resource that meets the lifetime requirement for their project.
The question of when to allocate resource assets is of significance. The industry believes that competitive bidding process must differentiate between the underlying asset which also determines the risk profile and the investment proposition. The prospecting and exploration assets have greater geo-technical risks than a proven reserve. These assets are expected to attract investors that have higher risk appetite and will make risk capital to be invested in the assets. For such assets, a framework that requires the investors to commit to a prospecting and exploration program is suggested, which also brings these in alignment with oil and gas sector which bears similar geo-technical risks. For the proven reserves, the process of competitive bidding can be adopted with certain preparatory works to package the assets for ready investment. The competitive bidding process with no such packaging will mean the project developer with already made investment to still bear the risks of technical and procedural risks such as delays in clearances and approvals, land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement. These risks are also expected to be reflected in the price or value discovered through the competitive bid and may not yield expected results. If packaged, the investors will be assured of readiness of the project and hence, are likely to be willing to commit their investment. This will also shorten the gestation period of mining projects and make the investments comparable to any alternative investment opportunities.
This competitive bidding is also likely to result in cash commitments from the investors at the start of the project. This will have to be looked at from the view that the cost components also have royalty elements that over the years has been based on ad valorem principles. In view of the initial pay outs that reflect the value of underlying natural resources, the royalty regime may be suitably modified. And like royalty, there are several other fiscal terms and conditions that apply on mineral assets and mining. For the competitive bidding process to be successful in meeting the objectives of the National Mineral Policy, the framework of fiscal measures must be stable. Radical changes in the middle of the project life cycle will cause the projects to suffer and the investor confidence to take a serious hit.
The mineral blocks that are competitively bid out to the winning bidders should not prohibit utilization of minerals for additional capacity additions in downstream processes, either within the same business group or even others, which also will be aligned to the stated objective of National Mineral Policy of judicious usage of mineral resources.
All these, however, may have serious implications for coal mining and power generation, which are connected sectors. The Electricity Act 2003 followed by the tariff policies provide for procurement of electricity by distribution companies only through competitive bidding. Case 1 and Case 2 bids as they are named through sections 62 and 63 of the Electricity Act have become the benchmark setters for electricity tariffs in India. The competitive bidding in coal sector for captive mining purposes cannot choose to ignore that a coal block bid may not remain separated from the bids for electricity that gets generated from this coal mined. It is easy to visualize the conflicting nature of these bidding processes. Bidding of coal mine is likely on the basis of maximum value ascribed to reserves while bidding of electricity is on the basis of lowest tariffs. Apart from these conflicts, the allocation of coal resources in whatsoever process is likely to create competitive distortions in electricity market. Considering these two factors, it may be best to package coal blocks with power projects, similar to the ultra mega power project (UMPP) initiatives that have been successful, and bid them together on tariff based competitive process.
Exception to competitive bidding could be made for grant of right to first applicant in case of non-notified areas for small scale mining.
The industry also believes that there should be level playing field between the government-owned companies and the private enterprises in terms of access to coal resources and freedom to monetize their assets and mineral products. Reserving coal blocks or mineral resources for government owned companies should be discouraged. However, if the government-owned companies that have invested in detailed exploration and proving the reserves, they could be given a preference. In case of their inability to develop such mineral resources, they should be put on the list of blocks for competitive bidding open for the eligible investors. The costs of prospecting, exploration and investigations may be paid to such government-owned company from the proceeds of the competitive bid.
(Dipesh Dipu is director in mining and metals consulting practice of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu India Pvt. Ltd. He can be reached at ddipu@deloitte.com. Views expressed in the article are personal and not necessarily reflect the views of the company)
While industry may aver with the intent to bring in transparency and systematic approach to allocation of mineral resource assets or blocks and may welcome the concept of competitive bidding for the same, there are concerns regarding the details of the procedure.
From the conceptual foundation, the process of mineral resource allocation must consider the questions of to whom, how much and when must the resources be allocated. In the context of power generation and Steel, the composition of raw materials in their total cost of production is high enough for these companies to seek backward integration. In such cases, they are likely to be viewed as eligible candidates for allocation. The clamor in the industry that competitive bidding process to allow only the captive mining requirements and to keep the independent mining companies out of the reckoning may be decided based on this criterion, as also on the depth of market. Independent mining companies may be allowed to operate alongside in order to widen the market participation. This, however, must also be subject to a preference to the consumers of the minerals or those who propose value addition. It makes business sense to add value to minerals through beneficiations or manufacturing rather than allowing such resources to be targeted at international markets in the raw form that fetches lower values for national resources. The bottom line is that the procedure must also allow for participation only the serious players. These can include reputed mining companies and consumer industry participants, who are direct stakeholders in the mining sector. Unrestricted participation is likely to result in cornering of precious resources and their opportunistic trading as when the market provides, and thus depriving the consumer industries the valuable input raw materials.
The question of how much is easy to address as the raw material security concerns will require the investors or project developers to look for size of resource that meets the lifetime requirement for their project.
The question of when to allocate resource assets is of significance. The industry believes that competitive bidding process must differentiate between the underlying asset which also determines the risk profile and the investment proposition. The prospecting and exploration assets have greater geo-technical risks than a proven reserve. These assets are expected to attract investors that have higher risk appetite and will make risk capital to be invested in the assets. For such assets, a framework that requires the investors to commit to a prospecting and exploration program is suggested, which also brings these in alignment with oil and gas sector which bears similar geo-technical risks. For the proven reserves, the process of competitive bidding can be adopted with certain preparatory works to package the assets for ready investment. The competitive bidding process with no such packaging will mean the project developer with already made investment to still bear the risks of technical and procedural risks such as delays in clearances and approvals, land acquisition and rehabilitation and resettlement. These risks are also expected to be reflected in the price or value discovered through the competitive bid and may not yield expected results. If packaged, the investors will be assured of readiness of the project and hence, are likely to be willing to commit their investment. This will also shorten the gestation period of mining projects and make the investments comparable to any alternative investment opportunities.
This competitive bidding is also likely to result in cash commitments from the investors at the start of the project. This will have to be looked at from the view that the cost components also have royalty elements that over the years has been based on ad valorem principles. In view of the initial pay outs that reflect the value of underlying natural resources, the royalty regime may be suitably modified. And like royalty, there are several other fiscal terms and conditions that apply on mineral assets and mining. For the competitive bidding process to be successful in meeting the objectives of the National Mineral Policy, the framework of fiscal measures must be stable. Radical changes in the middle of the project life cycle will cause the projects to suffer and the investor confidence to take a serious hit.
The mineral blocks that are competitively bid out to the winning bidders should not prohibit utilization of minerals for additional capacity additions in downstream processes, either within the same business group or even others, which also will be aligned to the stated objective of National Mineral Policy of judicious usage of mineral resources.
All these, however, may have serious implications for coal mining and power generation, which are connected sectors. The Electricity Act 2003 followed by the tariff policies provide for procurement of electricity by distribution companies only through competitive bidding. Case 1 and Case 2 bids as they are named through sections 62 and 63 of the Electricity Act have become the benchmark setters for electricity tariffs in India. The competitive bidding in coal sector for captive mining purposes cannot choose to ignore that a coal block bid may not remain separated from the bids for electricity that gets generated from this coal mined. It is easy to visualize the conflicting nature of these bidding processes. Bidding of coal mine is likely on the basis of maximum value ascribed to reserves while bidding of electricity is on the basis of lowest tariffs. Apart from these conflicts, the allocation of coal resources in whatsoever process is likely to create competitive distortions in electricity market. Considering these two factors, it may be best to package coal blocks with power projects, similar to the ultra mega power project (UMPP) initiatives that have been successful, and bid them together on tariff based competitive process.
Exception to competitive bidding could be made for grant of right to first applicant in case of non-notified areas for small scale mining.
The industry also believes that there should be level playing field between the government-owned companies and the private enterprises in terms of access to coal resources and freedom to monetize their assets and mineral products. Reserving coal blocks or mineral resources for government owned companies should be discouraged. However, if the government-owned companies that have invested in detailed exploration and proving the reserves, they could be given a preference. In case of their inability to develop such mineral resources, they should be put on the list of blocks for competitive bidding open for the eligible investors. The costs of prospecting, exploration and investigations may be paid to such government-owned company from the proceeds of the competitive bid.
(Dipesh Dipu is director in mining and metals consulting practice of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu India Pvt. Ltd. He can be reached at ddipu@deloitte.com. Views expressed in the article are personal and not necessarily reflect the views of the company)
